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Statistical evidenceaccumulatedin the20 yearsfollow-
ing Eugene Famas (1970) survey raises questions about
his conclusion that capital markets are efficient. Stock
price volatility has been shown to exceed the volatility
consistent with capital market efficiency. Other evidence
-for example, the small-firm effect, the January effect,
and other calendar-based anomalies of stock prices-
points in the same direction. Finally, analysts find it
difficult to explain stock prices even after the fact using
realized values ofvariables which, according to efficient
capital markets theory, should account for stock price
changes.
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Economist 1: "That looks like a $100bill over there on
the sidewalk."
Economist 2: "Don't bother going over to check it out.
If it were genuine, someone would have
picked it up already."
The theory of efficient capital markets says, most sim-
ply,that the prices of financial assets equal the discounted
value of the expected cash flows these assets generate. In
the context of the stock market, efficiency implies that
stock prices equal the discounted value of expected future
dividends. Investors are not assumed to form perfectly
accurate forecasts of future dividends, but they are as-
sumed to make effective use of whatever information they
have.Ifcapital markets are efficient in this sense, changes
in stock prices should be associated exclusively with new
information leading to revisions in expected future divi-
dends: when dividend prospects improve, stock prices rise,
and conversely.
Moreover, since all relevant, publicly available informa-
tion is discounted in asset prices as soon as it becomes
available, investors cannot construct systematically profit-
able trading rules based only on this information. Thus, in
anefficient market there isno motive to buy stockbased on
favorable information; if the information is in fact favor-
able, the market already has discounted it. In other words,
the $100 bill above could not be genuine; otherwise, it
would have been picked up already.
These observations suggest that factors not identifiable
with future profitability-fads, nonrational speculative
bubbles, investor psychology-should not affect stock
prices. In this regard, the stock market selloff on October
19, 1987, offers dramatic evidence that capital markets
may not be efficient. On that single day, stock values
declined by approximately a halftrillion dollars, a magni-
tude unprecedented in absolute terms. In relative terms the
selloff was comparable only to the stock market panic of
October 1929 which heralded the Great Depression.
According to the efficient markets theory, the selloff
could have been caused only by information made availa-
ble that day (or over the preceding weekend since October
19, 1987, was a Monday) that justified a downward revi-
sion on the order of 22 percent in the present discounted
29valueof expected future dividends. However,no economic
information of an even mildly unusual nature was made
public that day, let alone information that woulddrastically
increase investors' estimates of the probability of an im-
pending economic cataclysm. It istrue that investors were
worried aboutrecession, but nomore than theyusually are.
In any event, whatever fears of recession investors had
subsequently proved unfounded, as the economy showed
virtually noill effects following the stock market collapse.
Moreover,the partial recovery of stockprices inthedays
following the selloff can only be reconciled with the
efficient markets model if therecovery could be associated
with economic news inducing investors to believe that the
impending recession would, after all, not be as severe as
the news that led to the selloff had indicated. Again,
however, no economic news of the requisite importance
was reported during the week.of October 19.
This is notto saythat stock price changes on the orderof
ten ortwenty percent, evenoveraperiod as short as several
days, are never associated with changes of commensurate
magnitude in fundamentals. Following the June 1989sup-
pression of student protests in China, stock prices in Hong
Kong dropped by a magnitude comparable in relative
terms to the U.S. selloff in October 1987. The connection
between political conditions in China and the role of Hong
Kongfirmsinthe Chinese economyis sostrongthata stock
price change on the order of twenty percent is not an
obviously disproportionate response to the news that the
Chinese government opted to suppress rather than accom-
modate the liberalization that the students were advocat-
ing. Therefore, there is no clear conflict between market
efficiency and the selloff that occurred on the Hong Kong
exchange in June 1989.
A single dramatic event like the October 19, 1987,
selloff, however, does not invalidate the most important
prediction of the efficient markets theory, which is that
there should not exist trading rules that allow investors
systematically to outperform the market. Research con-
ducted in the 1960sand reported in Fama (1970)generally
supported this implication, leading financialeconomists to
conclude that capital market efficiency was corroborated
empirically.
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The more recent evidence, however, does not substanti-
ate.Fama's verdict. Detailed analysis using financial data
bases developed in the 1970s, and drawing on a more
extensive understanding of the empirical implications of
marketefficiency than wasavailablein 1970, suggeststhat
the October 19, 1987, selloff was not an isolated episode
(although, of course, it was virtually unprecedented in
magnitude). Instead, the evidence now suggests that most
fluctuations in stock prices cannot be traced to changes in
rational forecasts of future dividends, contrary to the
prediction of the efficient markets model.
The new evidence arises from two areas of research
which developed largely independently. First, analysts
realized about fifteen yeats ago that market efficiency
implied an upper bound on the volatility of stock prices.
Empirical tests suggest that this bound is violated, indicat-
ing that stock prices are more variable than is consistent
with market efficiency. Second, beginning about the same
time analysts came to realize that stock returns display a
variety of systematic patterns that are difficult to explain
within a framework of rational optimization. The "vari-
ance-bounds" and "anomalies" literatures are surveyedin
this paper.
Some economists view the updated evidence on market
efficiency as demonstrating that the theory of efficient
capital markets is wrong, and that investors are simply not
as rational as efficient markets theory assumes. If so, it
follows that capital markets are probably not doing a good
job ofresource allocation. Most economists, however, start
out with a strong commitment to the assumption that
people act rationally, and these economists will not reject
theefficient markets model-andwith it, the presumption
that capital markets are doing a reasonably good job of
allocating capital-unless confronted with absolutely air-
tight evidence against efficiency. None of the evidence
reported in this paper meets such an exacting standard.
Therefore those who start out with a strong predisposition
in favor of capital market efficiency interpret the recent
evidence as perhaps raising questions about the theory and
suggesting topics for future research, but not as justifying
definitive rejection.
Economic Review / Spring 1990Substituting t+1fort, (2)becomes:
E(dt+2 + Pt+21 It+l)
Pt+ 1 = 1 + P (3)
Using(3)toeliminatePt+I in(2), thepriceofstockcanbe
written:2
Et (dt+l) Et (dt+2 + Pt+2)
P, = 1 + p + (l + p)2 (4)
HereE, (.) is usedas an abbreviated notation forE (.IIt ) .
Proceeding similarly n-1 times, thereresults:
Et(dt+l) Et(dt+2) Et(dt+n I)
Pt = 1 + p + (1+p)2 + ... + (1 + p)n I
Et (Pt+n + dt+n)
+ (l + p)n (5)
(2)
realistically, thatif suchinvestors exist, they donotaffect
prices.
Fama (1970) distinguished three versions of market
efficiency depending on the specification of the informa-
tion set It. Markets are "weak-formefficient" if It com-
prisespastreturnsalone, "semi-strong-formefficient"ifIt
comprises allpublicly available information, and"strong-
form efficient"ifItincludes insiderinformation aswellas
publicly-available information. 1Itisclearthatstrong-form
efficiency implies semi-strong form efficiency, which in
tum impliesweak-form efficiency, sinceexpected returns
thatcannotbe predictedbasedon a large information set
surely cannotbepredictedbasedonasmallinformation set
thatiscontained inthelargeinformation set. However, the
reverse implications donotfollow; a capitalmarketeasily
could be weak-form efficient but not semi-strong-form
efficient, orsemi-strong-form efficientbutnotstrong-form
efficient.
Theefficient markets model(1) says thatratesofreturn
on stockare unpredictable. Itmightappearto follow that
the efficient marketsmodel implies that stockprices are
completely without structure, but that is not the case. In
fact,theefficientmarkets modelturnsouttobeexactly the
samemodel as the present-value relation with which the
efficient capitalmarkets model was identified intheintro-
duction. The derivation of this equivalence follows. Be-
cause(oneplus)therateofreturnisbydefinition equalto
thesumofthedividend yield(d/pt) andtherateofcapital
gain(Pt+IIPt), (1) can be rewritten as:
E (dt+1 + Pt+1 1 It)
P, = 1 + P
I. TheEfficient Markets Model
Contrary to the impression given above, the efficient
markets modeldoes notstartoutassuming thatassetvalues
equal the present value of expected future cash flows.
Rather, the present-value representation is derived from
themoreprimitiveassumption thattherateofreturnriton
thej-th stock (more generally, thej-th asset) satisfies:
E v» IIt) = P (1)
Herelt comprises investors' information at t; E(.IIt )
denotes themathematical expectation of(.) conditional on
It; p, the expected rate of return on stock, is a positive
constant, on the assumption thatcapitalmarketsareper-
fect andinvestors arerisk-neutral. Equation (1) says thatan
investor withinformation Itwillpredictanexpected rateof
return equal to p for any asset. Since this is the same
prediction that an uninformed investor would make, the
efficient marketsmodel implies thattheinformation setIt
is useless in predicting expected rates of return. In this
sense information It is "fully reflected" in securities
prices.
For example, suppose that It contains the history of
dividends, earnings,sales,advertising outlay, andcosts for
firm j up to date t, and possibly also macroeconomic
variables like GNP, interestrates, commodity prices, and
the money stock. Equation (1) says that no matter what
values thevariables inIttake on, assetpriceswilldepend
on these values in such a way that the expected rate of
returnonthej-th assetis always p. If so, an investor who
knows dividends,earnings,andsoonis nobetteroffthan
an investor who does not know the past history of these
variables sincetheuninformed investor canalways predict
an expected rate of returnof p without knowing It and is
assured that his prediction will coincide with thatof the
informed investor, whopredicts anexpected rateofreturn
of p forall values of It.
Ifateachdatetheexpected rateofreturnoneachassetis
p,itfollows thattheexpected rateofreturnonanyportfolio
isalsop, since theexpected rateofreturnonaportfolio is
justaweightedaverage oftheexpected ratesofreturnonits
component securities. Accordingly, notradingrulesbased
on information It can generate an expected rate of return
greater than p. Of course, an investor in possession of
information betterthan"themarket's"informationItcould
usethisinformation todetectdifferentials inexpected rates
ofreturnamongthevarious assets,andconsequently could
construct profitabletradingrules. However, efficient mar-
ketstheory postulatesthattheredonotexistinvestors with
information better thanthemarket'sinformation, ormore
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Assuming that (1 + p) nEt(Pt+n)convergestozeroasn
approaches infinity, (5) becomes the familiar present-value
equation:
Et (dt+1) Et(dt+2)
Pt = 1 + P + (l + p)2
Et (dt + 3 )
+ (1 + p)3 +
Further, the proofiscompletely reversible, implying that if
the present-valuerelation (6) is satisfied, so is the efficient
markets model (1). Samuelson (1965, 1973) and Man-
delbrot (1966) were the first to state this result and to point
out its relevance to efficient-markets theory.
What is striking here is that even though dividend
changes in (6) can be partly forecast, the generating
equation (1)implies that rates of return cannot be forecast.
Forexample, if "themarket" expects dividends to rise, the
price ofstock will be high relative todividends now,sothat
when dividends do rise, no extra-normal return will be
generated. Stockholders will earn extra-normal (sub-nor-
mal) returns only if dividends increase more (less) than
had been expected. Thus if capital markets are efficient, a
general expectation of a dividend increase does not imply
that stocks should be bought (or, for that matter, sold),
since the expected increase is already reflected in market
pnces.
This similarity between the efficient markets model and
the "fundamentalist" model means that the much-pub-
licizedfeudbetweenWallStreeters, whoanalyze stocks by
computing discounted cash flows, and efficient marketers,
who believe that rates of return cannot be forecast, is
largely based on misunderstanding. The fundamentalist
model focuses on the predictable part of prices, whereas
the efficient markets model focuses on unpredictable re-
turns, but the mathematical equivalence between the two
models guarantees that there is no inconsistency.
However, the dispute is not entirely without substance:
fundamentalists do not assert that prices are exactly equal
to the discounted value of future dividends, but rather that
prices fluctuate around the discounted value of future
dividends. This apparently trivial difference is essential,
since only in the latter case can profits be made by buying
stocks that are priced lower than fundamentals justify, and
selling stocks that appear to be overpriced. If underpriced
and overpriced securities do not exist, as advocates of the
efficient markets model maintain, then such trading strat-
egies cannot succeed.
Inderiving the expected present-value equation (6) from
the efficient capital markets model (1),it was necessary to
assume that (1 + p) v E, (pt+n) converges to zero as n
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approaches infinity. This convergence assumption means
that price is expected to grow more slowly than the rate at
which future returns are discounted. Violation of the
convergence assumption would mean that there exist spec-
ulative bubbles: even though price exceeds the discounted
value of expected dividends, investors are willing to hold
stocks because they anticipate that price will exceed ex-
pected dividends by an even wider margin in the future.
Itis known that, in theory,speculative bubbles can exist
even in simple models in which agents are assumed to be
rational and to have identical preferences and endow-
ments, and in which there is no uncertainty (Gilles-LeRoy
1989). In such countries as Japan, where stocks routinely
trade at prices 50 times earnings (although such figures are
difficult to interpret because accounting practices are dif-
ferent in Japan from those in the U.S.), it is plausible that
speculative bubbles are an important determinant of stock
prices. However, the same is probably not true of the U.S.,
where stocks trade at price-earnings multiples on the order
of10or 15.It is noteasy todevise empirical tests which can
reliably detect the presence of bubbles. However, one
particularly simple kind of bubble WOUld, if it occurred,
result in a sustained downward trend in the dividend-price
ratio as stock prices rose without limit. Data for the
dividend-price ratio in the U.S. do not display any down-
ward trend. The absence of trend in the dividend-price
ratio led West (1988a), for example, to conclude that
speculative bubbles are probably not an important compo-
nent ofU.S. stock values.
The expected present-value model often strikes people
ashighly implausible. Many investors donotevenconsider
dividend levels in their investment decisions. Instead they
buy stocks that are believed likely to appreciate. Further,
the stocks of many firms which do not pay,and havenever
paid, dividends command high prices. The proposition
that rates of return cannot be forecast, on the other hand, is
very appealing: the negation of (1) has the unattractive
implication that there exists some information variable
known to investors which they can use to construct sys-
tematically profitable trading rules. Yet the mathematical
equivalence of (1)and (6) (granted the convergence condi-
tionjustdiscussed) means that it is logically inconsistentto
reject the expected present-value model while at the same
time accepting the unpredictability of rates of return.
If the reasonableness of (1) is accepted, it follows that
the objections to the logically equivalent (6) cannot be as
compelling as they appear at first. It is perfectly natural
that investors might exhibit greater awareness of capital
gains than dividends, given the greater variability and
unpredictability of capital gains. Although most investors
do not think much about dividend yields, the hypothesis
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nonethelessstill holds. Also, whetheragiven firmhaspaid
dividends in the past is irrelevant. What is relevant is the
firm's capacity to pay dividends in the future, which is
governed by the firm's earnings prospects. The expected
present-value equation (6) saysonly that the valueof afirm
that investors were absolutely certain would never pay
dividends in the future (even a liquidating dividend if the
firm were to disband or merge into another firm) would be
zero.
II. Market Efficiency and Its Implications for Volatility
The October 19, 1987, episode was not the first time
stock prices had dropped sharply in the apparent absence
ofnewsof COmmensurate importance bearing on dividend
prospects. October 19 was typical of major stock price
changes in this respect, not exceptional: most stock price
changes, major or minor, cannot convincingly be associ-
atedwith contemporaneous changes in investors' expecta-
tions of future corporate profits (Cutler, Poterba, and
Summers, 1987). Tothe extent that stock prices frequently
fluctuate in response to variables unrelated to dividend
prospects, stock prices in some sense should be more
volatile than is consistent with market efficiency. This
consideration led analysts to ask whether market effi-
ciency could be shown formally to have the implication
thatstock price volatility should belowerthan the volatility
ofdividends; and if so how this prediction could be tested.
Proponents of market efficiency were skeptical of this
approach. They argued that since efficiency implies that
prices respond instantaneously to new information, stock
price volatility cannot be deemed in any sense "exces-
sive." However,because market efficiency has been shown
to imply that stock prices equal the discounted sum of
expected future dividends, stock prices will behave like a
weightedaverage of dividends over time, and an averageis
always less volatile than its components. 3 There is no
contradiction, then, between the requirement that stock
pricesrespondquickly to newinformationand theimplica-
tion that the volatility of prices is related to that of the
underlying dividends stream.
Results oftests of the implications of market efficiency
for stock price volatility were circulated in 1975 in my
paper with Richard Porter (published in 1981). Thetiming,
incidentally, was not coincidental-our thinking on this
topic was prompted by the 1974-1975 stock market drop,
the most pronounced in the postwar U.S. economy up to
that time. Robert Shiller reported similar volatility results
in his 1979 and 1981 papers. These papers used different
analytical methods, but the results were the same: stock
price volatility is too great to be consistent with market
efficiency.
These papers alleging excess volatility of asset prices
were well-received by economists sympathetic to the idea
thatassetprice changes are notclosely linked to changes in
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the expected discounted value of the cash flows to which
these assets give title. However, defenders of the efficient
markets. model were motivated to search for statistical
problems with the specificeconometric procedures used in
theinitial papers. They found several serious biases, all of
which predisposedthe tests toreject market efficiency.The
most important papers here are Flavin (1983)and Kleidon
(1986). At the same time, new volatility tests were being
devised which were free of the biases that attended the
initial tests (West, 1988; Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro,
1985;Campbell and Shiller, 1988a, 1988b;and LeRoy and
Parke, 1990). These new tests continued to indicate that
asset prices are excessively volatile, although perhaps not
by as great a margin as the initial tests suggested.
Lawrence Summers has likened the findings of the
volatility tests to that of the statistical tests for a link
between smoking and lung disease. Early tests indicating
the presence of such a link were found to be contaminated
by statistical problems which biased the outcome toward
that finding. Nevertheless, subsequent tests, which were
free of statistical bias, continued to support the original
conclusion of a statistically significant link, although the
link was shown not to be as strong as had first been
thought.
The volatility test reported below, which is very simple
and yet appears econometrically sound, is drawn from
LeRoy and Parke (1990). Recall that the efficient markets
model says that stock price equals the discounted value of
expected dividends:
P
= Et (dt+ I) + Et (dt+2) + Et (dt+3) + (6)
t 1+P (l+P)2 (l+P)3
Because there is no direct wayto measure investors' infor-
mation, direct observation of E, (dt+ I ), E, (dt+ 2) , ... ,
is not possible. This greatly complicates the derivation of
the implications of market efficiency for price volatility.
However, it is possible to show that the less information
investors have,the higher will be the variance of the rate of
return (LeRoy,1989).Consequently, assuming markets are
at least weak-form efficient, so that investors' information
includes at least past returns, puts a lower bound on the
amount of information investors have, therefore implying
an upper bound on the variance of the rate of return. 4
33To derive the upper bound on the variance of the rate of
return, it is necessary to evaluate this variance when
investors predict future dividends using no information
otherthan past returns. It is assumed that dividends follow
a geometric random walk:
(7)
where the ES are constant-mean random variables dis-
tributed independently over time. Analysts disagree about
the accuracy of the geometric random walk specification.
Some evidence shows it to be surprisingly accurate for
such a simple specification, while other evidence suggests
that in somecontexts the geometric random walkspecifica-
tion can be misleading. For the present purpose the most
attractive feature of the geometric random walk is its
simplicity, which allows a very intuitive development
of the variance-bounds relations. More complex charac-
terization of dividend behavior, while allowing greater
accuracy, would necessarily complicate the discussion
by requiring use of more general analytical methods
(Campbell-Shiller, 1988, 1988a).
Whenmarkets are at least weak-form efficient the upper
bound on the variance of the rate of return on stock is the
variance that would occur if investors based their dividend
forecasts on past dividend behavior and nothing else. In
this case thegeometric random walkmodel implies thatthe
best guess about future dividends is that theyequal current
dividends, multiplied by a trend term which depends on
the mean value of E. Therefore price will be given by a
constant markup applied to current dividends:
P, = k d, (8)
If price is proportional to dividends, the rate of return will
equal the dividend growth rate multiplied by a constant
which is very near one. Tosee this, recall the definition of
the rate of return rt as the dividend yield plus the rate of
capital gain:
dt+! + Pt+! r = (9)
t P,
Substitutingp = kdtandPt+l = kdt+!into(9)andusing
(7), We have
r, ~ (k; 1) (1 +E,.1) - 1. (10)
Because k, the price-dividend ratio, is on the order of 25,
the multiplicative constant (k+ 1)/k is not far from one,
and therefore can be ignored. Thus the rate of return
approximately equals the dividend growth rate, and the
variances of these variables are approximately equal also.
In sum, this decreasing relation between investors'
information and return volatility implies that if capital
markets are at least weak-form efficient (and if dividends
follow a random walk) the variance of the rate of return on
stock cannot be greater than the variance of the dividend
growth rate.
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Chart 1 shows the Standard & Poor's stock price index
from 1926 to 1985, adjusted for inflation in commodity
prices using the producers' price index. As expected, real
stock prices display a pronounced upward trend over time,
reflecting corporate retained earnings and, to a lesser
extent, newequity issues. A verystriking observation from
Chart 1is that stock price volatility has decreased between
the 1930s and the 1980s. The decline from 1929 to 1932,
the rise in the mid-1930s, and the decline in the years just
before WorldWarII were much more pronounced than any
change occurring between World War II and the mid-
1970s. This decreasing volatility of stock prices goes
contrary to a common impression that stock market vol-
atility hasincreased in recent decades. Another observa-
tion isthat the October 19,1987, selloff appears in Chart 1
as only aminor drop at theend ofthe period, rather than as
the cataclysm it in fact was. Thereason is that it came after
nine months of rapid gains in stock prices, so that annual
data show only a small drop from 1986 to 1987.
34 Economic Review / Spring1990Chart 2 displays a simulated rate of retum series that is
representative of the pattern that would be expected under
weak-form market efficiency. To generate the artificial
stock prices on which the returns in Chart 2 were based,
investors were arbitrarily assumed to be able to forecast
dividends with perfect accuracy fiveyears into the future.
Beyondthat horizon, however,they were assumed to have
no information at all. Therefore they were assumed to
extrapolate dividends using a constant growth rate, as
implied by the geometric random walk. As would be
expectedin an efficient market, rates ofreturn werehigher
than normal in years preceding dividend growth that was
higherthan normal, and lowerthan normalin yearspreced-
ing low dividend growth. However, the relevant observa-
tion is that the rate of return has lower volatility than the
dividend growth rate, conforming to the implication of
market efficiency outlined above.
Chart 3 is similarto Chart 2except thattheactual rate of
return on stock, rather than the simulated return based on
market efficiency, is shown. Several aspects of this dia-
gram are surprising. Most striking is the decrease in the
volatility of both the rate of return on stock and the
dividend growth rate from the 1930s to the 1980s. This
decline in stock price volatility wasnotedin the discussion
of Chart 1. Chart 3 makes clear that the decline in the
volatilityofdividendgrowth isevenmorepronouncedthan
that in return volatility. However,for the purpose oftesting
thevolatility implications ofmarket efficiency,the relevant
observationis thatover thepostwarperiod the rate ofreturn
onstock was much more variable than the dividend growth
rate (in the prewar period the difference is not nearly as
great). This result is inconsistent with the stock market
being weak-form efficient.
Thevolatility testjustpresented waschosen because itis
easy to motivate intuitively. Because the test depends on
strong simplifying assumptions, it may be that the finding
ofexcess volatility arises from aviolationof these assump-
tions rather than of market inefficiency. For example,
without-the simplifying random walk assumption, it is not
necessarily true that the variance of the growth rate of
dividends is an upper bound for the variance of the rate of
return. Equally important, the version of the expected
present-value model used to derive the volatility test incor-
porated the assumption that the discount rate is constant at
p.Changingreal interest rates over time are therefore a
conceivable alternative to market inefficiency as a cause
of the apparent excess volatility. However, both of these
possibilities have been explored extensively in the vari-
ance-bounds literature, and so far, it appears that allowing
for these more general specifications does nut help explain
the excess volatility.Thus, the conclusion that volatility is
excessive can be justified in much more general settings
than assumed here. The volatility test just reported then
should be regarded as a sample from the volatility litera-
ture in which simplicity of exposition is purchased at the
expense of restrictive specifications.
There are two possible sources of excess volatility in
stock prices. First, investors could be overreacting to
relevant information; second, they could be reacting to
information which is irrelevant according to the efficient
markets model. Although there do not appear to exist
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FederalReserveBank ofSan Francisco 35volatility between these two sources, it seems likely that
both are important.
That investors react to irrelevant information, at least,
has been well established. For example, Roll (1984)docu-
mented the importance of irrelevant information in deter-
mining orange juice futures prices. Efficient markets
theory implies that changes in the futures price of orange
juice concentrate will reflect changes in the spot price
which market participants expect will prevailat the date of
the expiration of the futures contract. Roll argued per-
suasively that the only variable that can plausibly be
viewed as giving relevant information about spot prices is
weather-specifically, weather forecasts leading market
participants to change their estimates of the probability of
a freeze in Florida, since a freeze would adversely affect
the orange crop.
Other variables which could in principle be relevant,
Rollargued, wouldbeexpected tohaveonlyminoreffectin
the context of orange juice futures prices since current
changes in supply induced by factors other than weather
are of secondary importance, inasmuch as these factors do
not change abruptly. For example, the number of trees
bearing oranges at any time reflects planting decisions
made several years earlier. Similarly, it appears unlikely
that consumers' income and the prices of such substitutes
as apple juice or tomato juice figure in an important way.
Thus the efficient markets model predicts that weather
should exert a dominant influence on futures prices. Roll
verified that low temperatures in Florida were in fact
associated with increases in orange juice futures prices, as
expected. However,only afewpercentof thetotal variation
infutures prices can be explained in this way. In fact, Roll
wasullable to find any variable at all which correlated
significantly with futures prices.
In his Presidential address to the American Finance
Association,Roll (1988) reported the results of tests of
whether the efficient markets model provides accurate ex
post explanations for stock prices. He found that, again,
irrelevant information appears to be of dominant impor-
tance. Even using such data as industry average prices and
aggregate stock market indexes, Roll was able to explain
expost only a small fraction of the variation in prices of
individual stocks.
IV. Asset Pricing Anomalies
There has always existed evidence at odds with the
simplest models incorporating market efficiency. Prior to
the 1970s, this conflict between theory and evidence usu-
ally was dismissed on the grounds that with relatively
minor modifications, the efficient markets model could
accommodate the contrary observations. For example,
analysts identified trading rules that apparently could
generate systematic profits, contrary to the efficient mar-
kets model. However, when these analysts allowed for
brokerage charges, the profits usually evaporated.
More recently, however, analysts have recognized that
there exists evidence that is not easy to square with the
efficient markets model, even after making reasonable al-
lowance for brokerage charges and other transactions
costs. The "P-E anomaly" (Basu 1977, 1983)is the most
prominent. It refers to the finding that stocks with low
price-earnings ratios generate systematically higher rates
ofreturn thandostocks with high P-Eratios. Thispattern is
difficult to square with any recognizable version of the
efficient markets model. In an efficient market, the stock
price of successful firms should rise, but only by as much
as isconsistent with the firmsearning normalreturns inthe
future, and similarly with unsuccessful firms.
In contrast, it is easy to relate the P-E anomaly to the
excess volatility of stock prices, at least informally. If
investors overreact to news, then the stocks of successful
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firms will be bid to a higher multiple over earnings than is
justified by the objective probability of this success con-
tinuing in the future. Subsequently the euphoria will wear
off, generating low or even negative returns on average.
Similarly, investors may be overeager to unburden their
portfolios of losers, to the point where these stocks are
discounted more than the facts justify. Subsequently such
stocks on average generate higher returns than normal as
their prospects improve. Correspondingly, this pattern of
systematic overreaction to news would be expected to lead
toprice volatility inexcess ofthat predicted bytheefficient
markets model. Therefore it is possible that the excess
volatility of stock prices is the same thing as the P-E
anomaly.
DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) recently have docu-
mented a pattern similar to the P-E anomaly. They com-
pared fictional portfolios of "winners"- stocks that had
appreciated significantly in the recent past-with similar
portfolios of "losers." They found that the losers strongly
outperformed the market generally in subsequent years,
while winners earned lower returns than the market aver-
ages. This result also suggests a pattern of overreaction,
although the relation between DeBondt-Thaler'sresult and
the P-E anomaly remains unclear.
Development of large data bases suitable for com-
puterized study of stock prices have led to new anomalies.
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and Kinney, 1976; see Thaler, 1987, for a survey). Rozeff
andKinneyfound that rates ofreturn on stock averaged3.5
percentin January, whereas in other months returns aver-
aged only 0.5 per cent. Several explanations involving
tax-relatedpurchases and sales of stocks havebeen investi-
gated,butthese explanations are not entirely convincing.
Another anomaly is the "small-firm" effect (Banz,
1981) in which small firms appear to earn higher returns
thanlarge firms, even when allowance is made for differ-
encesin riskiness. A subsequent study (Keirn, 1983)
showed that the January effect and the small-firm effect
maybethe same thing: the January effect appears only in
samples that give equal weight to large and small firms.
Value-weightedsamples, in which small firms havemuch
less importance relative to their role in equal-weighted
samples, show little evidence of a January effect. This is
exactly the pattern that would be expected if small firms
account for the January effect.
Still other calendar-based anomalies have surfaced in
recent years. Cross (1973), French (1980), and Keirn
and Stambaugh (1984), among others, have analyzed the
"weekend effect," which refers to the observation that
stock returns are on average negative from the close of
trading on Fridays to the opening of trading on Mondays.
Gibbonsand Hess (1981) showedthat asimilar effectexists
for bonds. Further, we have the "Wednesday effect":
in 1968 the New York Stock Exchange was closed on
Wednesdaysin order to allow the back officesof brokerage
houses to catch up with paperwork. Roll(1986)foundthat
the volatility of stock prices was lower from Tuesday to
Thursday when the market wasclosed on Wednesdaysthan
overtwo-day periods over which the Exchange was not
closed..This puzzle is difficult (although not impossible;
see Slezak, 1988) to reconcile with market efficiency,
given that as.much news about corporate dividends pre-
sumably was arriving when the market was closed on
Wednesdays as on other weekdays. The implication is that
to some.extent the trading process itself generates price
volatility, a phenomenon clearly inconsistent with market
efficiency. Finally, there exists a day-of-the-month effect:
stockreturns are positive in the days surrounding the tum
of the month, but are zero on average for the rest of the
month (Ariel, 1985).
Finally;Tinic and West (1984) investigated the seasonal
pattern in the risk-return tradeoff. Fama and MacBeth's
(1973) paper earlier had verified the prediction from fi-
nance theory that high-risk firms earn higher average rates
of return than low-risk firms. Motivated by the results on
the January effect, Tinic and West investigated the sea-
sonal pattern in the correlation between risk and return
which Fama-MacBeth had estimated. Theyfound that this
correlation is due entirely to the data for January. Given
Keirn's result that small firmseam high returns in January,
and given the obvious fact that small firms are riskier than
large firms, it is not surprising that the correlation between
risk and expected return is strongest in January. What is
surprising, however, is that the correlation between risk
andreturn isessentially zero forthe other elevenmonths of
the year.Inasmuch as investors are risk-averse,this lack of
compensationforrisk inelevenof the twelve months ofthe
year is not easy to reconcile with market efficiency.
V. Conclusions
Several essentially unrelated types of evidence that
capital markets are inefficient havebeen discussed in this
paper.Since it isnoteasy to think ofnon-trivial predictions
of the efficient markets model that are borne out em-
pirically, the burden of the evidence is negative. (Of
course, trivial predictions are borne out. For example, it
is true that the sustained upward trend in dividends that
has occurred in the U.S. economy is associated with sus-
tained price appreciation, as the efficient markets model
predicts.)
How important this conclusion is depends on what lies
behind the contrary evidence. The version of capital mar-
ketefficiency adopted in the variance-bounds test reported
aboveis grossly over-simplified (forexample, equation (1)
doesnot allow that investors are risk-averse, and therefore
will demand a higher rate of return on high-risk securities
thanon low-risk securities). If it weretotum out thatminor
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
modification of theefficient markets model weresufficient
to dispose of the contrary evidence, then the violations of
market efficiency would not be important. However,most
of the obvious extensions of the efficient markets model
have been tried already, largely without success so far.
Although it is possible that these extensions of theefficient
markets model will succeed in the future, it may at some
point be necessary for economists to face the uncongenial
task of thinking about a world in which asset prices do not
behave according to the precepts of finance and economic
theory.
Economists are accustomed to thinking of prices not
simply as measuring the amount of wealth that is trans-
ferred from one person to another when goods change
hands, but also as guiding resource allocation. This is true
as much for asset prices as for the prices of consumption
goods. Tosee how this works in the context of asset prices,
37thinkofthepetroleum market.Thereexistsalargebutfar
frominfinite supply ofoilreserves in theMiddleEastand
otherpartsoftheworld. Othersourcesofenergyexist,but
theyareatpresentmoreexpensive thanpetroleum, at least
for suchpurposes as automobile transportation andheat-




equalitywiththe alternate energy sourcejust as thelast
gallollofoiFisextracted,sothatenergyusers.areinduced
toshiftsourcesatexactly therighttime. Before thatdayof
reckoning, petroleum pricesmustberisingtoguarantee to
holdersofpetroleumreserves acompetitivereturn-tfnthis
stylizedaccount, thepriceof petroleum givesexactly the
right signals to •users of petroleum: they have adequate
incentive to conserve, but are not inducedirrationallyto
squanderotherresources soastosave petroleum. Itfollows
that a massive program to encourage conservation or




Evidence of capital market inefficiency means that it
cannotbe takenforgrantedthatasset pricesaredoing as
goodajob of rationingresources amongalternative users
as theforegoing account implies. The existing price of
petroleum may not, afterall,fullyreflectthebestinfonna-




It is apparent that all·extreme·interpretation.of the
evidenceagainstcapitalmarketefficiency hastheeffectof




theidea thatpricesdeterminedincompetitive marketsdo a
reasonably goodjobofallocating resources. Theevidence
reviewed heresuggests, rather, thateconomists oughttobe
aware that the evidence in favor of their way of thinking
abouttheeconomy is farfromclear-cut.
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* Amoredetailed version ofthispaper isfoundinLeRoy
(1989).
1.•Although theseverbalcharacterizations of market effi-
ciency are drawn directly from Fama (1970), it is not
unambiguously clear that Fama identified market effi-
ciency with the fair-game model (1); see LeRoy (1976,
1989) for discussion.
2. Used here is the rule of iterated expectations, which
saysthatE (E (dt+21It+1)I E(dt+21It), andsimilarly
forPt+2'
3. Even thoughfuturedividendsareweighted differently
from current dividends because of discounting, and fu-
turedividendsarenotknown withcertainty, pricebehaves
like anaverageof dividendsovertime.
4. The test to be described is known as the "West test"
(West, 1988), although theoriginalversion oftheWest test
isformally equivalentto oneof thevolatility testsderived
by LeRoy-Porter (1981). (See Gilles-LeRoy, 1988.) West's
derivation was independent, andhewasthefirstactually
toconductthetest. Also, West wasthefirstto realize that
the return volatility test has certain econometric advan-
tages over price volatility tests, particularlyfor diagram-
maticpresentation. These advantages justifyadoption of
theWest testhere.
In one respect the test reported here differs from
thatderivedbyLeRoy-Porter andWest. Theformal deriva-
tion of the West test assumes constant-variance linear
processes, whichisanunsatisfactory specification inlight
of the upward trend in stock prices over the past fifty
YElqrs.ln order to correctfor scale,Chart3.in$tea.dcom-
pares-the rate of return with the dividends growth rate.
Formal derivationofthevalidityofthiscomparison, which
is based on the linearization procedure of Campbell-
Shiller (1988), isfound in LeRoycParke (1990).
5. The implication that the prices of exhaustible re-
sources should rise at a rate approximately equal to the
real interest rate has been studied by Schmidt (1988).
Schmidt found no evidence of rising prices over time,
implying that holders of wealth in theformof exhaustible
resources earned a zero real rate of return.
REFERENCES
Ariel, Robert A. "A Monthly Effect in Stock Returns,"
Journal of Financial Economics 17: 1985. 161-174.
Banz, Rolf. "TheRelationship between Return andMarket
Value of Common Stock," Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 9: 1981. 3-18.
Basu, Sanjoy. "Investment Performance of Common
Stocks in Relation to their Price-Earnings Ratios: A
Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis," Journal of
Finance 32: 1977. 663-682.
____ . "The Relation between Earnings' Yield, Mar-
ketValue andReturns forNYSE Common Stocks: Fur-
ther Evidence," Journal of Financial Economics 12:
1983.129-156.
Campbell, John Y. and Robert J. Shiller. "The Dividend-
Price RatioandExpectations ofFuture Dividends and
Discount Factors," Review of Financial Studies 1:
1988.195-228.
____ . "Stock Prices, Earnings, andExpected Divi-
dends,"Journalof Finance 43:1988a. 661-676.
Cross, Frank. "The Behavior of StockPrices on Fridays
and Mondays," Financial Analysts Journal: 1973.
67-79.
Cutler, David M., James M. Poterba and Lawrence H.
Summers. "WhatMoves StockPrices?" reproduced,
Harvard University, 1987.
DeBondt, Werner and Richard Thaler. "Does the Stock
Market Overreact?" Journal of Finance 40: 1985.
793-805.
Federal Reserve BankofSanFrancisco
____ . "Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction
andStockMarket Seasonality," JournalofFinance 42:
1987.557-581.
Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work," Journalof Finance 25:
1970.383-416.
and James D. MacBeth. "Risk, Return and
Equilibrium: Empirical Tests," Journal of Political
Economy 81: 1973. 607-636.
Flavin, Marjorie A. "ExcessVolatility intheFinancial Mar-
kets: A Reassessment of the Empirical Evidence,"
Journal of Political Economy 91: 1983. 929-956.
Gibbons, Michael and Patrick Hess. "Day of the Week
Effects and Asset Returns," Journal of Business 5:
1981. 579-596.
Gilles, Christian and Stephen F. LeRoy. "Bubbles and
Charges," reproduced, University ofCalifornia, Santa
Barbara, 1988.
Grossman, Sanford and Robert J. Shiller. "The Determi-
nants oftheVariability ofStockMarket Prices," Ameri-
can Economic Review 71: 1981. 222-227.
Keim, Donald B."Size-Related Anomalies andStockMar-
ket Seasonality," Journalof Financial Economics 12:
1983. 13-22.
____ and Robert F. Stambaugh. "A Further Inves-
tigation of the Weekend Effect in Stock Returns,"
Journalof Finance 39: 1984. 819-840.
39Kleidon, Allan. "Variance Bounds Tests and StockPrice
Valuation Models," Journal of Political Economy:
1986. 953-1001,
LeRoy, Stephen F. "Efficient Capital Markets: Comment,"
Journal of Finance 3: 1976. 139-141,
___-. "Efficiency and the Variability of Asset
Prices," American Economic Review 74: 1984. 183-
187.
_____ . "EfficientCapital Markets and Martingales,"
Joumelot Economic Literature, 1989.
andWilliam R. Parke. "StoqkPriceVolatility:
Tests Based on the Geometric Random Walk," re-
produced, University of California, SantaBarbara,
1990.
LeRoy, Stephen F. and Richard D.porter. "The Present-
Value. Relation: Tests Based on Implied Variance
Bounds," Econometrica 49: 1981, 555-574.
Mandelbrot, Benoit. "Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbi-
ased Markets, and Martingale Models," Journal of
Business 39: 1966. 242-255.
Mankiw, N.Gregory, David Romer, and Matthew D.Sha-
piro. "An Unbiased Reexamination of Stock Market
Volatility," Journal of Finance 40:1985. 677-687.
Roll, Richard. "Orange Juice and Weather," American
Economic Review 74:1984. 861-880.
____ . "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Take-
overs,"Journal of Business 59:1986. 197-216.
____ . "R2," Journal of Finance 43: 1988. 541-566.
Rozeff, Michael S. andWilliam R. Kinney. "Capital Market
Seasonality: The Case of Stock Returns," Journal of
Financial Economics 3: 1976. 379-402.
40
Samuelson, Paul A. "Proof that Properly Anticipated
Prices Fluctuate Randomly," Industrial Management
Review 6:1965. 41-49.
____ ."ProofthatProperly Discounted Present Val-
ues Vibrate Randomly," Bell Journal of Economics
andManagement Science.4: 1973. 369-374.
Schmidt, Ronald. "Hotelling's Rule Repealed? An Exam-
ination ofExhaustible Resource Pricing,"Federal Re-
serve Bankof San Francisco Economic Review, Fall,
1988.41-53.
Shiller, Robert. 'The Volatility of LongTerm Interest Rates
and Expectations Models of the Term Structure,"
Journal of PoliticalEconomy 87: 1979. 1190-1209.
____ . "Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be
Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?"
American Economic Review 17: 1981. 421-436.
Slezak, Steve L. "The Effect of Market Interruptions on
Equilibrium Asset Return Distributions in Dynamic
Economies with Asymmetrically Informed Traders,"
reproduced, University ofCalifornia, San Diego, 1988.
Thaler, Richard. "Anomalies: The January Effect," Journal
of Economic Perspectives 1: 1987. 197-201.
Tinic, Seha M. and Richard R. West. "Risk and Return:
January vs.theRest oftheYear," Journal ofFinancial
Economics 13: 1984. 561-574.
West, Kenneth. "Dividend Innovations and Stock Price
Volatility," Econometrica 56:1988. 37-61,
____ . "Bubbles, Fads and Stock Price Volatility
Tests: A Partial Evaluation," Journal of Finance 43:
1988a.639-656.
Economic Review / Spring 1990